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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Corporation Law-MISLEADING PROXY SOLICITATIONS. Mills v. Elec-
tricAuto-Lite Co., 90 S. Ct. 616 (1970).
Plaintiffs were shareholders of the Electric Auto-Lite Company until
1-963 when it was merged into the Mergenthaler Linotype Company.
Their complaint alleged that the proxy statement distributed by the
Auto-Lite management to solicit shareholders' votes in favor of the
merger was misleading, in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.' The proxy solicitation stated that the Auto-Lite
Board of Directors recommended approval of the merger, but failed to
indicate that these directors were also nominees of Mergenthaler, and
under its control. Under the terms of the merger agreement an affirma-
tive vote of two-thirds of the Auto-Lite shares was required for ap-
proval, and the defendants controlled only fifty-four per cent of the
stock. The assent of a substantial number of minority shareholders
was indispensable for approval of the merger.
The district court concluded that a causal connection between the
material error in the proxy solicitation and the merger had been dem-
onstrated, and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.2 The
Court of Appeals reversed on the causality issue. It held that if the
defendants could demonstrate that the merger, in all probability, would
have received a sufficient affirmative vote even if the proxy statement
had not been misleading, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief.3
1. Section 14(a), 78 Stat. 569, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964), provides that "[ilt shall be
unlawful for any person... [to solicit any proxy] .. .in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . .' Rule 14(a)-9, 17 C.FR.
240.14a-9 (1969), promulgated pursuant to the statutory authority contained in the sec-
tion, provides that:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement ...written or oral, containing any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state
any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading ....
2. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
3. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968). The Court of Appeals
acknowledged that this test corresponds to the common law fraud test of whether the
injured party relied on the misrepresentation. From this it concluded that "[rieliance by
thousands of individuals, as here, can scarcely be inquired into . . ." and held that the
issue was to be determined by proof of the fairness of the terms of the merger. If the
defendants could show that the merger had merit and was fair to the minority share-
holders, the trial court would be justified in concluding that a sufficient number of
shareholders would have approved the merger had there been no deficiency in the
pro-, statement.
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The Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming the position of the district
court on the causality necessary to support a section 14(a) action.4
The right of a shareholder to pursue a private cause of action against
a corporation for a violation of a Securities and Exchange Commission
rule is a relatively recent judicially created remedy." In 1934 the Securi-
ties Exchange Act was enacted with the legislative intention of protect-
ing investors." Section 14(a) of the Act was created to regulate proxy
solicitation practices, and Rule 14(a)-9 thereunder to prohibit false or
misleading solicitations. 7 The congressional purposes of section 14(a),
however, were not fully reflected in the remedies expressly created for
its enforcement. Although provision was made for the Securities and
Exchange Commission to enforce compliance with section 14(a), no
private right of action was established for those injured by its violation.'
4. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co, 90 S. Ct. 616 (1970).
5. Although Congress prescribed rules to be adhered to in the issuance of proxy
statements and provided fines for infractions of the rules, no right of action was given
to a person injured by a defective proxy solicitation. This anomaly existed for thirty
years, until 1964, when the Supreme Court provided for a private right of action in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Of paramount importance in the Court's
reasoning was the fact that the Securities Exchange Commission was incapable of ade-
quately policing the 2000 proxy statements that it approves each week. It was felt that
creation of the right in the shareholder would provide a necessary supplement to Com-
mission action. See, Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of J.
Case v. Borak, 12 U.C..A. L. REv. 1150 (1965); 1964 U. IL. L.F. 838 (1964); 50
CORNE.L L.Q. 370 (1965).
6. S. RaP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934):
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the
manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be en-
lightened . . . as to the major questions of policy, which are decided at
stockholders meetings. Too often proxies are solicited without explanation
to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority
to cast his vote is sought.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934):
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every
. security .... For this reason the proposed bill gives the ... Commission
power to control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with
a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the
free exercise of voting rights of stockholders.
See Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 207-08 (1961).
7. See note 1 supra.
8. The three sections expressly providing for private remedies are: § 9(e), 48 Stat.
889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. S 78i(e) (1964) (on price manipulations); § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) (on insiders' profits); § 18, 48 Star. 897 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78(r) (1964) (on misleading statements). There is no express remedy provi-
sion made for section 14(a). The Court in Borak in creating a private right of action
ignored the expressio unis est exclusia alterius argument, i.e, that no private right was
intended by Congress under section 14(a) because none was expressly provided.
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This condition existed until 1964 when the Supreme Court, in J. 1. Case
Co. v. Borak,9 held that relief was available in a private action by a share-
holder against a corporation for violation of section 14(a). Borak did
not delineate the causal relationship between statutory violation and in-
jury which must be demonstrated to support the action. 10 The lower
courts, in effect, were given a mandate to further develop the growing
body of the "Federal Common Law of Corporations". 11
Since Borak the lower courts have interpreted the causality require-
ment in two ways. One group of cases suggests a "but for" test for
causation, while the other suggests merely that some causal nexus or
"transactional function" be present.'3 The "but for" standard requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the merger was effected by the mis-
leading proxy statement through influence on the voting results, while
the other standard requires only that there be a "transactional function"
between the defective proxy statement and the alleged corporate injury.
The "but for" test was applied in Barnett v. Anaconda Company, 4
the court holding that the complaint failed to assert a causal connection
between the defective proxy and the merger because approval of the
merger was a foregone conclusion. The defendant, in that instance,
owned more than the necessary number of shares to complete the
merger. Conversely, on similar facts, Laurenzano v. Einbender'- applied
the "transactional function" test, determining that if the management
of the corporation found it necessary for legal or practical reasons to
solicit proxies, the solicitation was sufficiently related to the merger to
satisfy the causation requirement.
9. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
10. Id. at 431. The Court referred to the causality question as an issue to be decided
at trial, however, it failed to provide any guidelines for use by the trial court in de-
termining what is sufficient causality. For a definitive treatment of cases involving the
"causal connection" requirement, see L. Loss, SEcuarrIs REGUIATMN 2433-39 (Supp. 1969).
11. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co, 281 F. Supp. 826, 829 (N.D. III. 1967). See
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
383, 412-414 (1964). Judge Friendly foresaw the development of federal common law
of corporate responsibility already underway in decisions by federal courts.
12. See, Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hoover v. Allen,
241 F. Supp. 213, 231 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); cf. Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp.
758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
13. See Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. N.Y. 1966); General Time
Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. d&nied, 393 U.S. 1027
(1969); cf. Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
15. 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. N.Y. 1966).
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In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the Supreme Court repudiated the
rigid "but for" test because it defeats the purpose for which the private
right of action was initially granted in Borak.16 The plaintiff does not
have to prove that any injury was caused by the misleading proxy solici-
tation. He need only demonstrate that the proxies were needed for
completion of the merger and that the proxy solicitation contained a
material defect.'7 The Court left open for lower court resolution the
type of relief which might be granted to the plaintiff, but clearly indi-
cated that damages are recoverable only to the extent shown.18 The
16. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 90 S. Ct. 616, 620 (1970). The Supreme Court
rejects the Court of Appeals' attempt to employ the "but for" test by using a judicial
appraisal of the merits of the merger.
The decision below, by permitting all liability to be foreclosed on the
basis of a finding that the merger was fair, would allow the stockholders
to be bypassed, at least where the only legal challenge to the merger is a
suit for retrospective relief after the meeting has been held. A judicial
appraisal of the merger's merits could be substituted for the actual and
informed vote of the stockholders.
The result would be to insulate from private redress an entire category
of proxy violations-those relating to matters other than the terms of the
merger. Even outrageous misrepresentations in a proxy solicitation, if they
did not relate to the terms of the transaction, would give rise to no cause
of action under S 14(a). Particularly if carried over to enforcement actions
by the Securities and Exchange Commission itself, such a result would
subvert the congressional purpose of ensuring full and fair disclosure to
shareholders.
Further, recognition of the fairness of the merger as a complete defense
would confront small shareholders with an additional obstacle to making a
successful challenge to a proposal recommended through a defective proxy
statement. The risk that they would be unable to rebut the corporation's
evidence of the fairness of the proposal, and thus to establish their cause
of action, would be bound to discourage such shareholders from the private
enforcement of the proxy rules that "provides a necessary supplement to
Commission action."
For an interesting criticism of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mills written by the
counsel for the plaintiff in Borak see Elson, The Meaning of JI. Case Co. v. Borak-
Remedies Available for Violations of Proxy Rules Under the Federal Securities Act,
23 Sw. LJ. 609, 614 (1969).
17. The Court does not decide whether sufficient causation would be present where
the management controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction with-
out any votes from the minority. However in footnote 7, 90 S. Ct. at 622, the Court
cites the Laurenzano case as one which has found sufficient causality on such facts.
Whether this is tantamount to approval of the case can only be conjecture, of course.
18. 90 S. Ct. at 624. The Court further discussed the effect of the finding on the
merger itself and concluded that the merger was not void but rather voidable at the
option of the plaintiff. In addition the Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to
reimbursement from the corporation for the costs of establishing the cause of action.
The fact that no monetary award for the injury might be forthcoming in the lower
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decision has resolved all doubts concerning section 14(a) violations in
favor of the shareholders that the statute was designed to protect. The
Congressional policy of insuring that the shareholders are able to make
an informed choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions is
thereby reinforced.
LEONARD F. ALCANTARA
Armed Services-THE RIGHT To PRE-INDUCTION JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 90 S. Ct. 661 (1970).
Petitioner Breen was given a II-S, student deferment, pursuant to the
provisions of the MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967.1 Subse-
quently, Breen's local board declared him a delinquent and reclassified
him I-A.2 Breen appealed the reclassification and sought an injunction
in the district court to prevent possible induction. The court of appeals
affirmed3 the district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction.4
On certiorari,' the Supreme Court held that a student deferment is
guaranteed by statute and cannot be revoked as a punitive measure.6
Therefore, when the local board violated its statutory authority, pre-
induction judicial review should have been available to test the legality
courts and the absence of express statutory authorization for reimbursement was not
a bar to recovery of costs.
1. Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 6, 81 Stat. 102 amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(h) (1964)
(codified at 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969)).
2. Petitioner Breen surrendered his registration certificate to protest the United States'
involvement in Viet Nam. Every registrant must carry his draft card at all times. 32
C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1969). Breen's local board declared him delinquent and reclassified him
for failure to perform his duty.
3. 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969).
4. 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 1968). The district court relied on 50 App. U.S.C.
§ 460(b) (3) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 50 A's. U.S.C. § 460(b) (3) (1964), which
states that:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any
registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense
to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title [section 462
of this Appendix], after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or
negatively to an order to report for induction .... Provided, that such
review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local
boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact
for the classification assigned to such registrant.
5. Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 394 U.S. 997 (1969) (order granting
certiorari). While the case was pending in the court of appeals, a petition to the ap-
propriate selective service appeal board for review of the local board's action was denied,
and Breen was ordered to report for active duty.
6. Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 90 S. Ct. 661 (1970).
1014
